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SECOND SESSION

WASHINGTON, SATURDAY, JANUARY 24, 1970

No.6

House of Representatives
The House was not 1n session today. Ita next meeting will be held on Monday, January 26, 1970, at 12 o'clock noon.

Senate
SATURDAY, JANUARY 24, 1970
tlon of S. 30, I had some words to say
about ccrtn.in Members who participated
in that debate, notably the Senator from
Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN), the Senator
in charge of the bill.
- Through inadvertence, I forgot to
mention the outstanding efforts of the
distinguished Senator from Nebraska
(Mr. HRUSKA), the ranking member of
the Judiciary Committee and good right
hand of the Senator from Arkansas in
consideration of the bill which had been
considered for the previous 3 days and
which passed the Senate yesterday.
At this time I wish to extend to the
Senator from Nebraska my thanks for
his diligence, for his integrity, for h.is
knowledge, and for the continual efforts
he made not only during the 3-day debate but also over the past year in helping to bring outS. 30.
I would feel remiss if the RECORD did
not show, in addition to those mentioned by me yesterday, my personal
appreciation to the distinguished Senator from Nebraska for the contributions
he made to the consideration of this
most Important bill.
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SENATE RESOLUTION 292U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on
yesterday, I made a speech relative to
Senate Resolution 292, a resolution seeking to bring about a substantial reduction of U.S. troops and dependents in
Europe, which together number somewhere In the vicinity of 600,000, almost
a quarter of a century after World War
n ended.
At that time, I brought out some statements made by the President of the
United States In his address on the state
of the Union to Congress assembled in
the Hall of the House of Representatives on Thursday last.
In the RECORD, it 1s carried as a separate statement, which I do not mind,

because It points up what he said and it
also empha.~ lzcs the fact that I approved
thoroughly of what he had to say in the
field of foreign policy.
But what I intended to do was to show
the relationship between the excerpts
from the President's statement in the
foreign policy field and the situation
which confronts us in Europe where we
have, as I have indicated, roughly 600,000
troops, dependents, and civilian employees a quarter of a century after the
end of World War II.
I had hoped to develop a continuity
which could be used In answers to questions. So, Mr. Preside11t, In view of the
fact that this was not done as I had
anticipated, I ask unanimous consent
that, following the news story from
Frankfurt in West Germany, which I
incorporated in the RECORD, my remarks
relative to President Nixon's state of the
Union message as It affects foreign policy be incorporated not only in the permanent RECORD but also in the RECORD
today and that it all be reprinted as
spoken at that time.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection it Is so ordered.
SENATE RESOLUTION 292-U.S.
FORCES IN EUROPE
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, In
the New York Times of Janua ry 21, 1970,
on page 4, there is published an excerpt
from a speech by Under Secretary of
State Richardson in Chicago, telling us
how the European countties, our allies,
especially Germany, are hoping to offset
the balance-of-payments drain on our
mllitary deployment in Europe and
how we are exploring ways and means
of making this arrangement more
adequate.
In that same issue of the New York
Times, on page 64, an article states that
Germany has just cashed 1n prematurely
a billion marks' worth of U.S. Treasury
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bonds purchased in 1968 to oliset the
drain caused by the stationing of American troops in West Germany.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the article entitled "Germany recalls Bonds of United States
Early" printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed In the RECORD,
as follows:
0FRMANY RECALLS BONDS OF UNITED STATES
EARLY
FRANKFURT, WEST GERMANY, January 20.The Bundesbank disclosed today that It has
prematurely recalled a billlon marks of
United States Treasury Bonds purchased .In
1968 to otrset the dollar drain caused by
the stationing of American troops In West
Germany.
Under the 1968 otrset agreement with the
United States Government. West Germany
had acquired $500-milllon worth or 4 Y. -year
Treasury bonds for 2 billion marks.
The premature recall was made to help Increase the West German Central Bank's own
liquldlty In foreign currency, a Bundesbank
official explained.
Because of the Inflow of dollars res ulting
from the transaction. West German foreign
currency reserves Increased 536.400.000 marks
to 5,928,891,000 m a rks on bal£Ulce In the week
ended Jnn. 15, Bundesbank reported.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on
yesterday, the President of the United
States delivered his state of the Union
message to a joint session of the
Congress.
It was a fine message. It was a message with a lot of merit to it. CertainlY
the meat will be there when the specifics
are forthcoming to cope with the recommendations and goals, which President
Nixon has outlined.
During the course of that speech he
said, speaking of foreign policy:
Today, let me describe the directions or
our new pollcles.
We have based our policies on an evaluation of the world as It Is, rather than as It
was twenty-five years ago at the end of
World War II. Many of the policies which
were necessary and right then are obsolete
today.
Then, beca u se ot America's overwhelming
military and economic strength, the weakness of other mnjor free world powers and
the lnab1llty or scoree of newly Independent
nations to defend- let alone govern-themselves, America had to assume the major
burden for the defense or freedom In the
world.
In two wars, first In Korea nnd then In
Vlet!1Mll, we furnished most of the money,
m ost of the n•ms and most ot the men to
help others defend their freedom.
Today the grent Industrial nntlons of
Europe, as well as Japan, have regained
their economic strength, and the nations of
Latin Amerlc~nd many ot the nations
that n.cqulred their freedom from colonial·
Ism after World War II In Asia and Africahave a new sense ot pride a.nd dignity, and
a detennlnatlon to assume the responslblllty
tor their own defense.
That Is the basis ot the doctrine I an·
nounced at Guam.

If I may interpolate there, the Guam

declaration formed the basis of the Nixon doctrine, which I wholeheartedly endorse and which I was pleased to see the
President annoWlce yesterday applied
not only to Asia but to the rest' of the
wurld as well,

Continuing the President's remarks:
Neither the defense nor the development
ot other nations ca.n be exclusively or primarily an American undertaking;
The nations of each part of the world
should assume the primary respon.slbillty for
their own well-being; and they themselves
should determine the terms of that wellbeing.
To Insist that other nations play a role Is
not n retreat from responslblllty, but a sharIng of responsibility.
We shall be faithful to our treaty commitments, but we shall redu ce our Involvement
and our presence In other nations' arratrs.

Mr. President, to that I say, "Amen."
Mr. President, on January 20, the
Under Secretary of State, the Honorable
Elliot' L. Richardson, examined U.S. relations with Western Europe, in general,
and the question of U.S. force levels in
Europe, in particular, in an. address before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. At the beginning of his speech,
Mr. Richardson referred to the resolution I submitted to the Senate on December 1, Senate Resolution 292, which calls
for "a substantial reduction of U.S. forces
permanently stationed in Europe."
In Introducing that resolut.ion on
December 1, I made a statement on the
floor of the Senate setting forth the reasons that I thought justified a downward
adjustment of the level of our forces in
Europe. I pointed to the enormous costs
involved in maintaining a Military Establishment of 3.5 million men under
arms with 1.2 million men outside the
United States and over 300,000 of thesetogether with 235,000 dependents and 14,000 U.S. civilian employees-in Western
Europe. I pointed to the fact that our
net foreign exchange gap with Germany
is runnil1g at about $965 mlllion a year,
and I should note parenthetically that
Mr. Richardson reminded his Chicago
audience that-The balance-of-payments drain of our
military deployment In Europe Is currently
about $1.5 billion a year.

I also pointed to the need to reduce
our military budget from its present level
of somewliere between $75 and $80 billion.
Mr. Richardson has now given the administration's arguments for maintainIng the status quo, as far as our force
levels In Europe are concerned. There
are, of course, two sides to every argument. I presented one side on the Senate
floor on December 1. The Under Secretary of State presented the other in Chicago on January 20. I hope that my
colleagues in the Senate, those in the
other body, and members of the public
will examine the two sides of the argument closely.
In this connection, and in order to
avoid repeating what I have already said
on the floor of the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Mr.
Richardson's speech, and the full text of
my December 1 statement, be printed
In the RECORD at the conclusion of my
remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
CRANSTON in the chair), Without objection, it Is so ordered.
<See exhibit 1.)

January
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Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I consider it necessary to make a few comments today, on Mr. Richardson's speech.
in order to make my position clear:
First of all, Mr. Richardson referred
to Senate Resolution 292 as an expression of the "tendency by some to say
that NATO has done its job, so why not
bring those troops home?" May I point.
out that Senate Resolution 292 is not an
expression of a belief that. "NATO has
done its job" but, on the contrary, of a
, belief that the United States has been
doing a disproportionate share of NATO's
job and that the other 14 members of
NATO are in a position to do more and
should do so. Nor does Senate Resolution 292 urge that all U.S. troops be
brought home but only !.hat there be a
"substantial reduction of U.S. forces permanently stationed in Europe."
Second, Mr. Richardson states that
the eiTectiveness of the strategy of flexible reasons "rests perforce on the conviction in both parts of Europe that the
United States will fulfill its detennined
role." Mr. Richardson added that " the
U.S. military presence in Europe,
whether we like IL or not, continues to be
taken as tangible evidence of our commitment" and that "any sudden or dramatic reduction" of that presence would
have " unpleasant consequences."
I would like to emphasize that Senate
Resolution 292 neither states nor implies
that we will not fulfill our NATO obligations. On the contrary, it affirms specifically that a substantial reduction of
U.S. forces permanently stationed in
Europe can be made "without adversely
affecting either our resolve or ability to
meet our commitment under the North
Atlantic Treaty." Furthermore, the resolution does not urge, and I have not
urged, that such a substantial reduction
be either "sudden" or "dramatic." Mr.
Richardson did not argue against a "sudden" or "dramatic",reduction but against
any reduction at all, for only a few paragraphs later he referred to the administration's having "pledged to maintain
our present troop strength in Europe
through fiscal year 1971."
Third, Mr. Richardson stated that if
"all of our forces in Europe were brought
home and stationed in this country, little or no savings would appear In our
defense budget." As I noted in my December 1 statement, however, It has always been argued that bringing a substantial number of forces back from
Europe will not aliect our defense budget
because we cannot reduce the number of
men under arms. But it is also argued
that It Is impossible to reduce the number of men under arms, among other
reasons because of the need to m aintain
present force levels in Europe. I contended then, and I do so again now, that
this endless circle, which will lead in the
end to fiscal exhaustion, can and must
be broken.
Fourth, Mr. Richardson referred to the
possibility of negotiating with the Soviet
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe mutual and balanced force reductions and said that the other reason th'!
administration opposCB Senate Rcwlu-
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tion 292 is "the firm belief that it would
weaken our bargaining position."
Mr. President, NATO has been studying mut ual and balanced forced reduct ions for years and has still not arrived
at an agreed proposal. Even when such a
proposal is formulated, there is no reason to assume that negotiations will
· begin for it is my understanding that
t here has been no indication that the
S oviet Union is interested in such negotin tions. And what if that continues to
be the situation? Will we then be locked
in to maintaining our present force levels
in Europe in perpetuity regardless of the
• costs involved or the wisdom of doing so
1n the light of our national interests?
In fact, the Soviets may not be willing
to reduce the military presence in
Eastern Europe no matter what the
United States docs or docs not do because the level of that presence may well
be dictated by political considerations
within Eas tern Europe. On the other
h and, U that is not so, then U.S. reduct ions may be the most cfiectlve way to
brinrr about Soviet reductions because the
Soviet Union could no longer justify the
presence of hundreds of thousands of
Soviet troops in Eastern Europe on the..
ground that there were hundreds of
thousands of American troops in Western
Europe.
Fifth. Mr. Richardson stated that "the
bulk of any substantial reduction in U.S.
forces will have to be made up by West
Germany, the most populous and
wealthy of our allies." He went on to
say that the Getman people and the
Soviet Union do not favor a larger German military establishment and that
such a development "would give pause
even to some of Germany's allies." I am not arguing that there should be
a la rger German military establishment
than has been agreed to before but only
tha t the West Germans meet their predetermined NATO commitments as we
h ave m et ours. I might say, parenthetically, that the same comment pertains to
other NATO countries as well. The fact
1s that in terms of the percentage of
armed forces to men of military age, in
many NATO countries that percentage
1s not only below the 8.7 percent found
1n the United States but also below the
4-percent figure which applies to West
Germany. And in all of the NATO countries that have compulsory military service-except Greece, Portugal, and Turkey-the period of service is shorter than
it is In the United States. In the case of
Canada, Luxembourg, and the United
Kingdom, there is no compulsory military service at all. I would also like to
point out that the United Kingdom with
a population of 55.5 m!llion, and Italy,
with a popula tion of 53.7 million, are
almost as populous as West Germany
with a population of 58.5 million. Furthermore, according to the Institute for
Strategic S tudies in London, Britain's
1969- 70 defense budget of $5.4 billion
was higher than Germany's 1969 defense
budget of $5.3 billion. On the other
hand, Italy's 1969 defense budget was
only $1.9 billion.
Finally, it 1s all very well to talk about
1.h l' "l'trenJrth, clo~n C'!:.". tm~t. rcA.IIsm.,
>s.::·.~ ':' t,\. ":•.'. l:t ~ ol ~.\ 1\.\ !U ~ll'. H.lvJI,
a.rdoon did in his concluding paragrapl\.

But it seems to me that there is a contrast between these words and the fact
that the 250 million people of Western
Europe, with tremendous industrial resources and long military experience, are
unable to organize an effective military
coalition to defend themselves against
200 million Russians, who are contending
at the same time with 800 million Chinese, but must continue after 20 years to
depend on 200 million Americans for
their defense. The status quo has been
safe and comfortable for our European
allies. But, as I observed on December 1,
it has made the Europeans less interested
in their own defense, has distorted the
relationship between Europe and the
United States, and has resulted in a
drain on our resources which has adversely affected our ab!llty to deal with
the urgent problems we face at home.
EJa-llBIT

1

AnonESS BY HON. ELr.lOT L . RICHARDSON, UNDEn
SECRETARY or STATE, BEFOIU!: THE CJUCAGO
CoUNCIL oN FoREIGN RELAnONS, CHICAGO,

ILL.
I would like today to examine one of tho
most !un<lnrncntnl o! our !orelgn policy con-

cerns, and one which In some ways 18 too
much taken !or granted, It not overlookedtale United States relationship 1x> Western
Europe and Western European security.
In a reverse twist on the e arly days o! the
Republic when George Washington used to
preach against yielding to "the lnsld1ous
wiles" of Europe's Influence, our baste ties to
Wes tern Euro pe are now eo firmly estn.bl1shed
that comment!U'y on the subject l.s rega rded
as a tiresome reatllrm.a tlon of the obvious.
Whereas President Washington warned
that European controversle6 were "essentially
foreign to our concerns" Presldelllt Nlxon wn.s
moved to observe on NATO's birthday last
spring that many people now find NATO
"quaint and famJ11ar and a bit old fashioned."
To much o! tale publlc the purposes oi
NATO have the character of a cUche. The very
Climate of securlty which NATO has fostered
hM, perversely, seemed to pcrrn.lt many to
disregard It or to think It obsolete. In the
wake of the re-examination oi !oretgn oommibnents occasioned by the VIet-Nam war,
there Is a tendency by some to say that NATO
has done Its job, oo why not bring those
troops home? In the U.S. Senate this !eellng
has taken concrete polltical expre6Sion In the
form of a resolution Introduced by Senator
Mansfield, one o! the most thoughtful students or America's role In world a!Ia lrs. IDs
resolution calls !or "substantial reductions"
of U .S. forces In Europe.
Meanwhile, Western Europe 1tseu, prosperous, mostly democratic, stable, and probably more secure than at any time In its
modern history, has been preoccupied with
the inevitable problems that are the byproduct o! a.tiluence and rapid economic
growth. These concerns seem to have caused
it to drift somewhat from the lofty goals of
a Un1flect Europe and Atlantic partnership
which gave a sense o! mlsslon to Its leadership two decades ago.
, On both sides of the Atlantic then, there
are fee lings of oomplacency and a restless
anticipation or new events. The memory o!
Ozechoslovak.la Is fading, the Brezhnev Doctrtne is dimmer, and a reduced sense o!
danger merges with the feeling that new
ln1tatives are both called for and Inevitable.
Perhaps In response to this atmosphere the
Warsaw Pact nations, led by the Soviet Union,
have called !or the convocation of a European
Security Con!erence, although- ironicallytheir suggested agenda would not even touch
the l>M.Ic II'Su ea or Europ~n.n e<'<lurl ty.

w

l11 Ull• »llllt>lh\11," lo, I lhlnk, W"t'l.hwh11e
~ake

a lNBh look

a~

t.he lllJ>l)()ftiiJona on.
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which our European policy resls, to examine
Its continuing validity, and to appraise
!rankly and realistically the propooals being
made for change and adjustment.
Two World Wars have led t he American
people to perceive with great cla rity that t he
security of the United States is directly linked
to the security of Western Europe.
Pursuant to this belle!, whlel1 was formalIzed In the North Atlantic Treaty of 1049,
the United S La tes has maintained a major
military es ta blishment on European so11 since
the early 1950's. U.S. nuc lear power as well
as conventional forces are available In supp ort of this treaty commitment. Although
Euro pe Is n ow Incomparably s tronger t han It
was when this arrangement was first contracted, Its ultimate security, llke our own,
continues to be llnkect to our power and
nuclear deterrence. Because or this, one or
President Nixon's first acts upon tak.lng office
wn.s t.o reaffirm the American commitment to
NATO and to promise ciooo and coniJnulng
cons ultation within the Alliance.
Deterrence Is a GUbtle concept. Its reality
takes form largely ln the minds of thooe who
might be contemplating aggression. It Is effective only when they conclude tha t any
possible adva ntnges o! aggression would be
o!Tsct by Its predictable cos t~.
NATO's atrn.tcgy of flexible respo nse Is calculated to Insure tha t any potential aggreRsor would come to just this conclusion.
Our conventional forces arc maintained In
position in Europe to r esis t possible a ttack
by Wmsaw Pact forma tions. They are meant
also to deter piecemeal aggr ession which an
enemy might be temp~d to conclude he
oould get away with U the only alternative
to our capitulation were the unleashing or
nuclea r war. These forces o.re supported by a
broad arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons,
available !or use U the Intensit y or the
aggression rises.
The entire effectiveness o! the flexible response strategy rests perforce on the conviction In both p a rts of Europe that the United
States will fulfill Its determined role. And
the United States military presence In Europe, whether we like It or not, continues to
be taken as tangible evidence o! our commit ment.
We must face the fact, therefore, that any
sudden or dramatic reduction In the Uni t ed
States military presence in Europe would
have unpleASant con seque n ces ot two kinds.
First, as a practical m111tary matter, NATO's
conventional defenses would be significantly
weakened. Other NATO members might be
tempted to follow suit and cut forces further.
In the event or aggression, a less powerful
NATO Alllenoe might be driven to resort.
more quickly to nuclear weapons.
Secondly, and of probably greater oonscquence, any sudden or major withdrawal of
American forces would have a distinctly destabilizing eaect on the European scen e.
The structure o! the Alllance, na Indeed
the C!lltlre structure of world order which
we have helped erect since the war, rests
In the final ana lysis on the shared confidence
that we shall honor our oonunltmcnts.
U that confidence Is eroded a rapid d eterioration can occur-a. deterioration not
unlike that which can send prices on the
stock market plummeting. And for this renson It l.s doubly necessary that we n ot light ly
or hastily make moves that might undermine confidence In the strength of our S1Ipport. It Is for this renaon that we h ave
pledged to mainta in our presen t troop
strength 1n Europe through Fiscal Yea.r 1971.
Let me stress that none o! this suggests
that U.S. troops w111 have to remain In Europe at present strength forever and ever.
Certaln1y we hope that future conditions will
allow modlflcatlons of our role. Our current
force level In Europe of 310,000 men already,
ln fp.ot, roprrr. •nt~ " orms;lf!orn.ble drop fr'>m
1.1111 11Nt-k ,,, ~f.rll ,fJ(II tu )~~~~ 1 Jtit.'t •.-..-' !'".t-J
viet war of n<' J ves 1111 11<11'1111. We are flltiO con-
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tlnuaJly studying and trying to Improve th\)
means by which troops stationed . in the.
Unlted States can be rapidly returne<l to Europe In case of crisis. The Mansfield Resolution urges that greater use be made of this
redeployment option.
Our studies show, however, that under
present conditions front-line forces hastily
returned to Europe In time of crisis could
not carry out their mission with the same
errectlveness as forces already in place. :.\.!though rapid redeployment of limited forces
Is feasible, large-scale efforts of this sort expose these forces to hazards and potential
confusion.
Moreover, financial savings would be negligible. If, for example, all of our current forces
In Europe were brought home and stationed
In this country, little or no savings would
appear In our defense budget. We might
even have to send a bit more, because we
would lose significant financial advantages.
In Germany, t he Federal Government
makes land, bou.sllng, facUlties and services
ava!lable to our forces at no cost, or at reduced costs. Duplicating such facUlties and
support in the United States would Involve
a heavy and continuing expense-one roughly cancelling out savings In shortened supply l!nes and transportation costs to Europe.
The balance-of-payments drain of our
m1litary deployment In Europe Is currently
about $1.5 billion a year. This is unquestionably a large figure, and, I! our forces were
returned to this country, many of those dollars would stay at home. The problem is
partially neutralized, however, by offset arrangements with the European countries,
particularly Germany and we are exploring
means of maklng these arrangements more
adequate. In addition, withdrawal of our
force from Europe would be likely to evoke
prompt countervailing effects, notably In reduced sales of military equipment to our
Allles and in general exports to those countries.
If we have not neglected the consideration
of means by which our presence In Europe
could be streamlined or modified without
damaging the essential structure of the Alliance, neither have we Ignored the opportunities which the era of negotiation we have
now entered may hold for the future. In
this area we must a lso make meticulous and
balanced judgments, taking care not to allow
our efforts to bring about agreements with
the Soviet Union to undermine our relations
with our friends In Western Europe.
We must have a proper regard for the always latent fear that agreements will be
reached detrimental to European interests.
We cannot, of course, allow the existence
of this fear to deter u.s from seeklng to lower
tensions. Ironically, In fact, there exists
among a younger generation of Europeans
the converse suspicion that the United States
and the USSR are collaborators In the defense of the status quo. But we Intend to do
everything possl ble to allay such fears and
suspicions by sticking strictly to our pledge
to consult closely with our allies and take
their Interests Into account as talks go forward. Only by such close consultation can we
quiet the Cassandras who see every etrort at
US-Soviet rapprochement or even minor
moves to adjust force levels as evidence of·
betrayal.
During the past year In-depth consultations have been held on a wide range of subjects, including the question of strategic arms
llmltatlons. The Deputy Foreign Ministers
of the NATO governments, at President Nixon's suggestion, held the first of what we
expect to be periodic reviews of major, longrange problems before the Alllance.
lt Is particularly Important that there
be the fullest consultations on the SALT
talks. The very fact that these talks are going
on has stimulated some uneasiness In Europe. It le well undcrst<>od that t.he tnlka
JlriiHtt· ~ltt..rrtr•~ str&begl~ nlaUru1s.hlps 1111t1

that their success could further atrect the
situation. As President Nixon put it last
spring: "The West does not have the massive
nuclear predominance today that It once
had, e.nd any sort of broad-based arms agreement with the Soviets would codify the present balance."
Given the European sensitivities on SALT
and nervousness about changing military
relationships, It would seem wise not to
compound anxieties at this time by any
moves to reduce our troop strength on the
con tlnen t.
While attempting to keep our allies abreast
of our own negotiating activities, we are
welcoming and encouraging their own efforts, particularly those of West Germany,
to improve relations with the Soviet Union
and the countries of Eastern Europe. One
of the most promising areas of potential
progress with the Eastern European nations
lies, we belleve, in reaching agreement on
mutual and balanced East-West force reductions.
We are now working with our allles to
develop models which could form the basis
for such an agreement. The NATO countries
Foreign Ministers, meeting last December,
said In their Declaration that despite the
fact that there had been no response on
earller suggestions, the Allles "will continue
their studies in order to prepare a realistic
basis for active exploration at an early date."
They concluded their studies on the subject had already progressed sufficiently to
permit the establishment of criteria which
reductions should meet. They directed that
further consideration also go forward on
related measures such as advance notification of military movements or maneuvers,
the exchange of observers at maneuvers, and
the establlshment of observation posts. This,
we are convinced, Is a constructive approach much more specifically, directed at
a concrete Issue generating tension than
t he Warsaw Pact's vague proposal for a
European Security Conference.
We hope the Warsaw Pact nations will respond. Reallsm, however, suggests that they
wlll be less likely to respond if a unilateral
reduction of U.S. forces appears In the offing
anyway. The firm belle! that It would weaken
our bargaining position on balanced force reduction Is thus another reason why the Administration opposes the Mansfield Resolution.
Among the questions raised by those who
favor an Immediate and substantial r eduction of our forces in Europe Is whether the
burden of NATO defense is now fairly allocated. The prosperous Europeans should, they
feel, carry a much larger share of the defense of their own continent.
We agree-up to a point. The United States
believes that our European allies can and
should do more. We have told them often
that I! they Increase their own efforts, it
would help us to maintain ours. So even
though they actually have Increased their
defense budgets to cover Improvements in
their forces, while our own defense budget
has been declining, we have and are continuIng to press them to assume a larger share
of Europe's defense responsibilities.
A precipitate reduction of United States
forces In Europe would, however, not only
fail to stimulate additional European effort,
It would probably produce the contrary ef'fect. The bulk of any substantial reductions
In U.S. forces would have to be made up by
West Germany, the most populous and
wealthiest of our NATO allies. But the German people do not relish an enlargement of
their country's military establishment. Nor
certainly does a soviet Union still highly
emotional about Its 20 milllon World War II
dead and enormously sensitive on the subject
or German "revanchlsm." Indeed, it would
give pause even to some of Germany's allies.
Any ln•IRnlficrmt rlso In tho O ormrm tlof~n~l' 1\lh>rt ooul!l thus !IOAtroy Ohn.noollor
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Brandt's constructive efforts to Improve relationships with the Federal Republic's Eastern
neighbors and thereby bait the attempts to
lay the foundation for a settlement or the
Issues stlll dividing Europe.
I spoke earller of the fact that we did not
want to su ggest that· the present number of
U.S. troops In Europe was Inviolate and could
or would never be changed. We hope that
contlltlons will eventually come about which
wlll render their presence altogether unnecessary. But when such conditions do
come, I feel certain they will be the result
of hard and patient bargaining.
Back In 1948, when the Cold War was very
cold Indeed, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul
Henri Spank, addressing hlmselr to the Soviets' Andre Vyshlnsky at a UN Security
Council session, said: "The basis of our
pollcy today in Europe Is fear. We are afraid
of you. We are afraid of your government and
we are afraid of the policies which you are
pursuing."
Twenty-two years later tensions are lower
and East and West are engaged In substant ive discussions aimed at lowering them
further. But the basic cement holdlng together the Alliance Is still the threat from
the East. The United States does not control
the Alliance. When France chose to withdraw from NATO we could not prevent It
from doing so. Unllke the Warsaw Pact which
r ests on an Ideological base guarded and
sanctified by the Soviet Union, NATO has no
dogmatic underpinnings. There Is no Western
version of' the Brczhnev Doctrine. When there
is no more threat to the securl ty of the nations of Western Europe, there will be no
more need for NATO. And only when the confrontation in Europe truly ends ancl a genuine peace replaces the always precarious
peace of mutual deterrence will the role of
our troops be finally accompllshed.
On another front, in res ponse to the President's Initiative, the Alliance has 't.c"tken on
a new dimension by creating a permanent
Committee on the Challenges of Modern
Society to help deal constructively with some
of' the most pressing problems common to
all of its members-the problems of· the environment.
The United States, meanwhile, continues
to support the goal of a politically and economically Integrated Europe. Despite the recent signs of drift, economic Integration has
come far, and there are indications that new
moves forward may be developing. The most
ambitious of the European regional arrangements-the European Community of the
Six-has already gone beyond the earller conception of International cooperation to a new
form of relationship among nation states.
Since the EEC was established In 1958 Its
members have abolished tarlfTs among themselves, agreed upon Important measures of
the harmonization, instituted an runbltious
common agricultural policy and removed
most barriers to the free movement of capital
and labor. As a group the Six have enjoyed
significantly higher rates of economic activity, trade and growtli than before 1956.
Inter-Community t r ade has almost quadrupled. Since 1967 Community trade with the
outside world hns exceeded that of the United
States.
The recent Summit Conference of the Six
at the Hague and the success of the Council
of Ministers of the Community In agreeing
on a far-reaching plan for financing their
common agricultural policy preface moves to
perfect the economic union and extend It to
new members in the next year or two. On
the latter point, the Interests of the United
States are very_ much engaged, not only
economically but militarily, for enlargement
of the European communities to admit countries not comml tted to the defense of the
West raises questions about the pos.~lbllitles
or pf>lltlcal 11l11ty, 0.11rl th"' IJT.tl•~\7' 'Ill
ntron«l,ll or til~ HATO A!11'.lrl<Je itst lf.
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In Europe, there Is a force of about 479,500 In
Vietnam.
May- I say. parenthetically, that as of last
Thursday, this Is 4,500 In excess of the 60,000
announced withdrawal by the President of
the United States. a withdrawal whlch was to
be met by December 15. 1969. Thus, I congratulate the Pres! dent for going beyond the
60,000 mark. I hope that this Is a continuation of n policy which, perhaps, may not be
announced but which wtll be continued tn
effect, to the end that more and more troops
can be wtthdrawn as appropriately as possible
from Vietnam and all of Southeast Asia.
There arc 129 ,000 In the fleets abroad,
58,000 In Korea, 45,000 In Thailand, 42,000 on
Okinawa, another 40,000 In Japan, 28,000 In
the Philippines, 24,000 In Latin America,
10,000 In North Africa and the Middle East
tlo n.''
and another 10,000 In Canada, Greenland,
In the past yenr, I believe, we have and Iceland.
streng thened the Alliance on ench of these
This commitment of men nbroad obviously
co unts. Strength, closeness, trust, realism, represents an enormous cost to tl1e people of
fieltlblllty-these wlll be useful assets as we the United States. It Is reflected In a milim ove toward the new hopes and new pos- tary budget of some $00 billion and In the
slbllllles or the "ern of negotlntlon."
tax rn,te<S. It Is nlso reflected In n bn,lance-ofpayments deficit which amounted to $1.3
SENATE RESOLUTION 292-SUDMISSION OF A billion In the first qunrtcr of this year.
SENATE RESOLUTION RELATING TO SUDSTANOur net foreign exchnngo gap with GerTIAL REDUCTION OF U.S. FoRCES PERMANENT- many alone Is now running at about $965
LY STATIONED IN EUROPE
m1lllon per annum. This Is the highest figMr.li1ANSFIELD. Mr. President, at this time ure to date. In 1968, the figure wn.s $887.4
this country has 429 major bases overseas million. It had been between $700 and $800
and 2.297 Jesser bases. These bases cover million In the period 1963 through 1967, and
40.000 square miles and are located In 30 under $700 ml\11on In the years before 1963.
In the past, part of this exchange gap has
countries . Stationed on these basese are 1,750,000 servicemen, families, and foreign em- been covered through various ngreements
wtth
the West German Government. In fisployees, and the cost of matntalnlng these
cal years 1962 through 1965 these so-called
b ases Is approximately $4.8 blllion a year.
lllr. Pres ident, I would like to discuss one offset agreements consisted simply of comarea In which we have a large number of mitments by the West German Government
ba.ses and an extraordinarily large number o! to procure military equipment 1n the United
States. The agreement for fiscal years 1966
troops, namely, Western Europe.
On January 19, 1967, I submitted Senate and 1967 provided for mllltary procurement
Resolution 49 which expressed the sense of plus the prepayment of a West German debt.
the Senate that "a substantial resolution or The fiscal year 1968 agreement provided for
U .S . forces permanently stationed In Europe mllltary procurement plus purchase of specan be made without adversely a.Jlectlng cial medium-term U.S. Treasury securities
either our resolve or ability to meet our com- by the West German Government. In fiscal
mitment undCT the North Atlantic Treaty." year 1969 the agreement provided for miliI wish to Introduce an Identical resolution tary procurement plus the purchase of apea gain today and ask unanimous consent elM U.S. Treasury securities by the West
that Its text be printed tn the RECORD at German Government, plus additional purthe conclusion of my remarks and that the chases of U.S. Treasury securities by West
resolution be referred to both the Committee German banks plus an agreement by Lufton Foreign Relations and the Armed Serv- hansa to finance purchases of aircraft.
I have had the Library of Congress draw
Ices Conun! ttee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution Wlll up a table showtng the terms of these socalled
offset agreements between the United
be received and referred to the Committee
on Foreign Relations and the Armed Serv- States and West Germany tn fiscal years
Ices Comm.lttee; and, without objection, the 1962 through 1969 and ask unantmous consent that It be pr1nted In the RECORD at the
resolution will be printed In the RECORD.
conclusion of my remarks.
(See exhibit 1.)
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection,
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, we have had it is so ordered.
several hundred thousand men In uniform
(See exhibit 2.)
sta tioned In Europe since 1951 when PresiMr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, agreement
dent TrUman, responding to the then exist- was reached wtth the West German GovernIng situation and to a Senate sense resol u tlon ment on July 9 covering fiscal years 1970
of that day, announced the first substantial and 1971. The agreement provides for an Inp ost-World War II Increase In U.S. forces flow of foreign exchange In the amount of
there. When Senate Res olution 49 was Intro- $1.52 billion over the next 2 years. In addiduced 2 years ago there were about 372,000 tion to m111tary procurement In the United
mlll t.'try personnel In Europe, Including TUr- States, the agreement provides for a West
k ey, Spain, n.nd the 6th Fleet In the Mediter- German Government loan, plus retention
r a nean; this force was accompanied by some In the United States for 2 years of Interest
240,000 dependents, a grand total of 612,000. earned by West Germany on U.S. Treasury
There are now about 315,000 men--a good deposits, plus the purchase by West Gerr eduction- and they are acoompa.nlcd by many of U.S. Export-Import Bank and Mar235,000 dependents-not a good enough re- shall Plan loans, plus West German civil
duction- and 14,000 clvlllans employed by procurement In the United States, plus paythe U.S . Government. Thus, there are over ment to a furid In the Unl ted States for en550,000 Amer1cans In Europe today who are couraging German Investment plus advance
ei ther In military service or associated wtth transfers for debt repayment by the West
the military, n.nd matntalned wholly or large- German Government to the United States. A
ly by the Government of the United States. concesslonal Interest rate of 3.5 percent
We now have, overall, about 3.5 million will apply to the West German Government
men under arms. Of this total, about 1.2 loan and to certain deposits in the U.S.
m illion are stationed outside the United Treasury for military procurement. I ask
:n .. ' "~ PN'rrt'tlin~ ,,.., -:\~>Mil l',.."'' ldPd by t.hc \lll:tnltn<lu" conecnt that the tt'xt ot n pron•1
L'<lJKtr•.men~ ~ DcfeDBe. In a<!<UUI>n h> th06t>
rel~Wtt> lhllell l>y t.ho Ol'pi\l'tmcnt ot l:lt"to on
The Unl ted Sta tes s ees no confilct between
the gonl of European Integration and the
effor ts n ow going forward to end the dan-·
gerou s and Increasingly anachronistic divisio n of the Continent. We welcome the Indi catio n tha t dissatisfaction over the continuing gulf between the two halves of Eur ope Is growing In the East as well. Stronger
rcl ntl ons hlps In Weslcrn Europe Itself can,
we belleve, fncllltnte the bulldlng of stronger relation s hips with the cast.
"I belleve we must bulld an Alliance," the
President has said, "strong enough to deter
those who would threaten war; close enough
to provide for continuous and far-reaching ·
consultation; trusting enough to accept
diversity of views; realistic enough to deal
with the world as It Is; flexible enough to explore new channels of constructive coopern-

July 9, giving the terms of the agreement,
be prtnted tn the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the press release
was ordered to be printed In the RECORD, 118
follows:
11

PRESS STATEMENT

"The U.S. and German delegations announced today the conclusion of a new agreement for offsetting foreign exchange costs of
American forces In Germany for U.S. Fiscal
Years 1970 and 1971. The delegations have
been conferring In Washington this week
on the third and concluding round of their
talks.
"The agreement provides for an Inflow of
foreign exchange to the U.S. In the amount
of 1.52 bllllon dollars. These Inflows wlll be
achieved by $925 mllllon or procurement of
U.S. goods and services (61% of total agreement) and $595 million o! financial meMures (39% of totnl).
"Details nre as follows:
" [In mllllons o! dollars]
"Military procurement In the
United States__________________
800.00
Federal Republic of Germany Joan
to the U.S. (repayable after ten
years) ---------------- -- - --- - 250. 00
Purchase by Federal Republic of
Germany of loans held In portfolio of Eximbank and of outstanding Marshall Plan Loans__
118. 75
Civil procurement In the United
States by Federal Republic of
Germany---------------------125. 00
Creation of fund In U.S. by Federal Republic of Germany to
encourage German Investment
In United States________________
150. 00
Advance transfers by the Federal
Republic of Germany for debt
repayment to the United States__
43. 75
Retention In the United States of
Interest earned by the Federal
Republic of Germany on U.S.
Treasury deposits______________
32.50
Total

1,520.00

"It was agreed that the Interest rate which
would apply to the Inter-government loan
and to certain Federal Republic of Germany
deposits In the U.S. Treasury for procurement would be 3.5 percent.
"The Export-Import Bank n.nd Marshall
Plan Jonns purchased by the Federal Republic of Germany would bear, on the average, a rate of Interest at four percent with
respect to certain loans and five percent
with respect to others.
"The U.S. delegation was led by Deputy
Under Secretary of State Nathaniel Samuels;
the German delegation was headed by State
Secretary Guenther Harkort o! the Foreign Office."
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I would
like to make several comments on the agreement. Before doing so, I should note that
the Department of State apparently believes
that this agreement represents a considerable Improvement over previous agreements.
To be sure, the amount of the military procurement Is greater that last year, or the
previous years. The borrowing by the United
States Is for a longer period than In the
past and a concesslona.l rate will apply to
the West German Government's loan. The
total amount Is higher than ever before and
the agreement Is !or 2 years Instead of only
one.
In those respecta there has been "Improvement." It would be well to bear In mind,
however, that there Is another side o! the
coin. While the amount of foreign exchange
Inflow tnvolved 1.s higher, so Is the !orelgn
exchange gap because It becomes more expensive every year to keep our forces In
Germany. With the reevaluation of the Germn.n mn.rk, mflrC()VOr, thtA
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more drnstlcA.Ily thnn In the pA.St. Further- phased reduction o! the size of the Ca.
more, the agreement represente only about nndlan forces In Europe."
According to press reports, which I under80 percent or the foreign exchange outflow
stand
to
be
accurate,
the
present
plan
Is
from the United Statoo to Germany in the
coming 2 Osca.l yeat'8. And, while the Weet to reduce the nwnber of the Cano.diBn conGerman Government loan to the United tingent o! about 10,000 In Western Germany
Stotes wlll cA.rry a concesslonA.l lntCTest rate to about 4,000. This La a small reduction 1n
or 3.6 percent, nevertheless It represente an numbers but a. large reduction In percentobllgntlon or the UnJ ted States whlch must age nnd would seem to represent, In effect,
bo renewed or re<ieemed; tho lntrrcst will B change In tho Cnnadlan estimate of the
rr"ult In some nnnunl cnpltn.l outflow and situation In Europe, ns well M a revision
the cnpltnl or tho loan Itself mUBt be r&- of policy on the part of the Canadlnn Govgnrded ns, eventunlly, B lA.rge Item of out- ernment. I would hope this Nation would
flow. Flnnlly, since the agreement Is !or a study the Cnnadlan action most cnrefully.
2-year period, It mny Imply a commitment To me, It seems an adjustment which looks
on our pnrt to retoln substnntlA.lly the pres- to the future Instead or to the past.
ent level o! U.S. forces In Germany for tJ1e
Lo.st year at this time, we too, nppeared
next 2 years whether or not that should to be on the verge of moving In the same
prove desirable or In acoord with our na- direction. There was widespread support In
tlonnl needs now or a yea.r from now. In the Senate for a proposal by the dlstlnfnct, the new West Oermnn Chnncellor said gulahed Senntor from Missouri (Mr. SYMIn nn Interview 1n the November 14 Issue o! INGTON) which would have had the effect
Tlmo mngnzlne thnt there was "nn under- of lowering substantially the level of our
~lnndlng on both sides," when nrgwnen.t
forces In Europe. Most regrettably, there WA.S
wns rcnch~d 001 nn olf8Ct arrangement for the occupation of Czechoslovakia on August
the next 2 yenrs, that there would be no 20 by 400,000 Soviet and other WBrsaw Pact
"subs\.nntlnl chnnges" In the level· or U.S. forces. The tlme was one o! extreme unforces during this period.
certainty, with various obscure troop moveNo mnttor how tJ1e current agreement Is mente In Enatern Europe. It was fM' from
regA.rded, tJ1ere Is no ese&plng the !act thnt elear that the relatl vely bloodless coup In
the n.-slgnment of U.S. milltory forces 1n CzechoslovakiA. would mark the culrn1natlon
Germnny n.nd Europe Is a voraolous consumer of tWa activity. There Wl\8 fear thBt tho difor U.S. resources, n source or lnfintlon e.nd, ficulties In Enstern Europe might spread
In present clrc111tL•te.ncoo, a factor 1n the throughout Europe.
reduction In the lntematlone.I strength or
As I stated at thnt time, a subs tan tlBl rethe dol!M.
duction In U.S. Forces In Europe In those clrIt Is a cliche to say that the Un1 ted States cumstnnces could have been subJect to mlaIs a rich and powerful country. Alter the lnterpretntlon In the East. and brought grave
long drnln on Vlctnnm, however, It may be uncertainty In the West. I o.dded, however,
wise to take another look at tJll\t glib asser- thnt, In my judgment, It remained desirable
tion. In tenns or surplUB for necessary na- to undertake a gradual reduction In U.S.
tlonnl purposes Bt homo and abroad, we forces If and when the situation In Enstern
nre begtnnlng to scrape the bottom or the Europe offered reasonable assurance thnt debarrel.
velopments there were not going to splll over
Other nations have come to reallze thnt Into Western Europe. It seems to me thnt
If they Bre to accomplish the essentlnl tasks
thnt time has now arrived. The Soviet Union
at home, Lt may be necessary to concentrate !nces serious problems In Czechostovnkla and
on only the essential tMks abrond. In my elsewhere In Eo.stern Europe. II thnt were not
judgment, It Is long pnst time for us to !ace enough, there Is a difficult sitUAtion to the
the facts of our sl tuatlon and reach the same Enat on the Soviet-Chinese border, Soviet
conclusion. In this connection, I welcome troops In Ozeolloslovakln, moreover, have
the Presldt-nt's July 9 order to reduce the been cut !rom several hundred thousand to
number o! mllltnry men biiSed abroad by about 70,000. While It Is regrettable that
14,900--i\lso hls most recent order or the day the lnternnl polltlcnl life or that enlightened
or so ngo In which npproxlmately another nation Ia agnln dlctnted by a foreign power,
14,000, nlmost all In tho Pnclflc area, will be certoln renlltlca ns they benr upon our milireduced lnsofnr M our Armed Forces are tary presence In Europe mu11t be !need. What
concerned-nltJ10Ugh In my Judgment It Le transpired In Czechoslovakia was not eonregrettnblo that the re<iuctlon Is so llnUted trollA.ble 1n o.ny fashion by NATO and benrs
nnd thnt the forces committed to NATO have no direct relntJonshlp to the quest ion or the
been completely exempted from thLs out 1n size o! Amerlcnn forces assigned In Europe
rn1lltary forces overscM.
to that organization. Hnd there been only one
On April 15, 1 ho.d printed In the RECORD or two divisions or, for that matter, seven or
the defense policy stntement mo.de by the eight or 18 divisions or Americans In WestCanadian Prime Minister on Aprtl 3. In that · ern Germany, lnsteo.d or four or five, would
statement, Prime Minister Trudeau enid:
they have had any different effect on the
"NATO Itself Is continuously reassessing situation ns It developed In CzechoslovakiA.
the role It plnys In the light of changtng !nat year? I cnn find no biiSis for any such
world condl tiona. Perhaps the mnJor dcvel· contention. Events within Eastern Europe
opment arrcctlng NATO In Europe lrtnce the are, na they have been since the Hungarian
orgnnlzntlon was founded Is the magnificent Interlude made appnrent tor all to see more
recovery or the economic strength of West- tthan a decnde ngo, beyond the direct reach
ern Europe. Thcro hna been a very great ot the North Atlnntlc Trenty nnd the military
chn nge In the nblll ty or European countries structure or NATO.
themselves to provide necessnry conven tlonol
Nevcrthele~s. It will bo argued, ns It Is aldefense forces nnd armnmcnts to be de- ways nrgued, that the time Is not right to
ployed by the alliance In Europe.
mnke a substnntlnl reduction or our forces
"It wns, therefore, In our view entirely ap- In Europe. But It seems that the time Is
proprlnto for Cnnndn to review and re-exnm· never rlgh t. I am aware of the recent press
tne tho nccrAqiLy In preoent olrcumstnnces reports, tor exnmple, Implying thnt NATO
!or malntnlnlng Cnnncllnn forceR In WooLcrn mny be on the point o! mnklng a proposnl
• Europo. Cnnntllnn forces nre now committed to the Soviet Union and Its Wnrsnw Pact
to NATO until the end or the present yenr. allies for negotlntlons on reducing convenThe Canadian force commitment !or deploy- tional forces In Europe. I would like to point.
ment with NATO In Europe beyond this out, however, that NATO hill! been studying
period Will be discussed with our nllles at the subject o! bnlanced force reductions for
the Do!ense Plnnnlng Committee meeting years. My undorotandlng Is that there Is still
ln Mny. 'I'lle Onnn!lll\!1 oovernmrnt Intends, no ngreod NATO proposal !or batanoOd !orce
In ron!'11lt.~t~M mt.b ~nndl\'~ fl.lll!'ll, to ~ko J'(!ductlona 111\d 1• Is not planned that thore
Will lit OliO \lntll M IOMt Mrl)' In tltO 111m•
_..._.~ ~ k" h't~ ato.;'"' A J'lAIII\C'Il lllld
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mer. Even then, there Is no renson to assume
that discussions, much less full negotlntlons,
will begin, for there has been no Indication,
direct or Indirect, that the Soviet Union Is
interested In such discussions.
I
It will also be argued, as It Is always nrgued,
that bringing a substantial number or forces ..
back from Europe Will not arrect our defense
budget because we cannot r educe the number
of men under nrms. But It Is also nrgued
that It Is not possible to reduce the number
of men under anna because or the need to
meet our NATO and other overseas commitments. This endless circle lending, In the end
to fiscal exlll\u.stlon can and must be broken.
I am not now ndvocntlng, and I have not
In the pnst advocnted, that all U.S. troope be
removed from Europe. Our vital Interest In
what trnnsplres In Europe remains and a
U.S. presence should remain. In this day e.nd
age an armed attack on Western Europe will
certainly Involve us almost from the outlret.
It Is to our Interest, therefore, that we nre
pre~elllt before tho outset. Thnt need co.n be
met, in my judgment, nnd should be met
With a much smaller rn1lltnry force.
At tho snme time, a subsbnntlal reduction
of our forces In Europe would have certain
Immediately beneficlnl etrecte on thls Nation.
In the first place, tho balance or pnyments
should soon reflect A. sharp d ecrease In outflow for rn11l tary purposes, e ven as It becomes
po!;s1ble to bring a-bout a reduction In the
Natlonnl military budget. In the second place,
a reducblon In U.S. forces In Western Europe
might provide some Impetus for Western
Europenns to develop their own defense erforte 1n line with their needs and to work
together more closely In d oing so. Integrated
defense Is supposed to be what NATO Is all
about. To the extent thnt we hA.ve continued
to overpartlclpate In the defense of Europe,
it follo~ tbnt there has been fBr less lntereet In bearing the burdens or that defense
a.mong the European themselves.
Finally, a substantial reduc tion of Amerlcnn forces would help to correot whnt I regard 1\8 a distorted rela tionship between
Europe and the United Stntes. The Soviet
Union ma.lnt..lne hnlf a million Aoldlers In
Elll!tcrn Europe. While the Russlnns mny
!\Scribe this presence to " threat from the
West, the !net Is that the Soviet presence Is
also a slgnlficnnt fnctor In maintaining com·
m'\tn1st governments In power, as Czec h oslovakln has so clenrly Illustrated. The democracies have no need of U.S. forces In order
to mnlntaln them~elves within the nations
of Western Europe; yet, thnt most significant
political fact Is disguised by our military
presence In such great magnitude.
In my judgment, It Is not B dc.slmble
sl tuatlon !or a foreign power el ther In
Eastern Europe or Western Europe to k eep
someWhere In the neighborhood or a million
men In these two cnmps, n quarter a! a century roter the events which Initially put
them there. Both contingents a re ~omewhat
annchronlstlc, to so.y the len,st. Yet the continuing presen<'o or t he one hM become the
principal basis !or the continuing presence
o! tho other. Tho persistence or the nnnchronlsm lends not only to a distortion or
pollLical relntlonshlps, but to n distortion of
economic reln t l onshlp~. Indeed, the annunl
orrset negotiation with the West German
Government Is n cnse very much In point.
West Germany Is, In errect, becoming n major
banker for this Nn-t lon In order that we may
pny for tho continued mnln te nnnce or U.S.
forces In Orrmnny nt this Nrttlon'a expen•r.
In short, the presence or Amerlcnn forces
In Europe In such lnrge numbers, In my jutlgment, hns velltlges, It not of empire In a lOth
century sense, then af rn1ll tnry occupation
nnd of the costly cold Wll.l' and of the onetime complete preeminence o! the dollar In
1nternn.ttono.l finance. Yet the a.ge of empire,
the era ot occtrpa~lon, the period of thll Mld
Wl\f llMtl 0Mf!•nlt1'!d 0111\Milfal pr~~I~De« t:te
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of the pll..St. The per~l:;tcnco of tb~sc vestiges
In prl"'ent poJJcles Involves, Jn my judgment,
a wnsteful and dangcrolL9 use of our avn.lln.ble
resource!!. It n.ct.s to d cbll1tate this Nation's
capn.clt.y, bOth at b orne and abroad, to deal
with the urgent problems a! the contempo·
r o.ry era.
"F.XHIOTT 2
"S. R>.s. 292

"Wherens the ! orelp;n policy and m!Utory
Pirrur,t.ll of tJtc Unit-ed Stntgs aro dNllco.trd
to the prot<-c-tlon o! our nntlonnl 6ecur!l.y,
thn pr~c~rrnt.Jon of the Ubcriles of the
J\morlcnn prop!<'. 1\lld the ml\lntenrmce of
world P"·'ce; n.nll
"1-\"hcrcns the United States, In ImplementIng these princlple.9, hl\9 nHtlnt.'\lned large
conttngcnw of American Anned Forces In
, Europe, l;of;rthcr with air 1\lld naval units,
for twenty years; and
"Wherrns the security of tho United St.ates
nne! lt8 cltl7,cns reml\1.111! Interwoven with
tho nreurlty of othN n ations s lgnl\tory to
th" North IH!ttntlc Treftty M It WfLS when
t he tren.ty wn.~ BlgnNi, but the conllltlon of
our Europcctn nlllea. both economlcnlly and
mtllt.ctrlJy, hn.s nppreclnbly Improved since
l ttrf:O contingt'nts of forces were deployed;
and
"Wh~rt>M the m cnn.s nnd cnpncLty or a ll
m~mn~rs Of t!Jc North Atln.ntlc Trcnty Or·
gnntc.o.t Jon t.o provld~ forces to res is t aggreR•Ion !ln.• sl!~nlficn n tly Improved since the
ortr·tn"l United l:>tntc-s dcploymt'nt: nnd
"W!l!'rcns the corrnnltmrnt by nil members
or the North Atlant ic Treaty ls b nsell upon
th<' full coopern.tlon of nil trcnt.y pn.rt ners In

Agreed
target
payment6

A(!l·eetl.
tarrtet
payments

"Fiscal ycors anll terms n.greed by
Western Germany:
1962·1963, Military procurement by
West Gcnmmy from the United
Stl\tes --------------- ---------- 1, 875
10Gl-1965 ~UIItnry procurement by
\\'est Germany !rom the United
Stntes ------------·-----·-·---· 1, 375

.

S497

1066-11167, Mlllt.ary procurement by

Wes t Germn.ny from the United
States plus prepayment of West
Germnn debt to the United Statea
In the amount of $192 million ••.. 1, 350
1068, Military procurement by Wes t

Gcrmsny from t-h e United States.

100

10613, Purchase by West Germ(IJ1y of

special U.S. 'l'rensury securlt.les__

500

l~tnl ------------------------

600

1908, Wes t Germn.ny agreed that

the Bundesbank would continue
Its practice of not converting dollars into gold.
1969 , l\1111 tary procurement by West
Germany from the Untted Sta.t<>s..
1969, Purcllnse by West Gcnmmy of
specln.l U.S. Trensury securities__
1969, Purchase of U.S. Trcnsury se.
curl ties by West Germnn banks..
Totnl -- -- - ------ -------- --- --

100
600
125
726

1969 . Lu!tl11\111l!\ agreed to finance
$60 million purchnse of n!rcrnft
In West Oerm11ony rather thsn

U.S. rrmrkct."

Mr. ELLENDER Mr. President, I mn
In complelc accord \\ith Ute views of Ule
Sena.tor from Montana.
F'or IJw pas t 10 ycn.rs I have been advocat.ing that we should remove our
cont.rlhut.Jnr, n1nterlnlA a.nd ntPn on n. fair £Uld
troops from Western Europe. It has been
equltnbl<' bu.siR. but s uch cont.rlbutlons hnve costing the taxpayer s of our Nation over
not bc<'n forthcoming from nJl other mem· $2 billion annually to hold au umbrella
bcrs of tho orgm>IZ!l:\lon; and
of rnllitary protection over our allies in
"Wl1er ens reln.tlollll between Enstcrn Europe that part O'f the world.
nnd W~:;tern Europe were ten~c when the
In my humble judgment, 1J1e1·e is no
largo contlngents of United Sta.tes forcoo
wert' deployrd In Europe but this sltuntlon reason for keeping them there. It is lrh n9 now und er gone substantial chnnge nnd 1itatlng to our former allies and has the
r ein tlons between the two pl\rts of Europe tendency of widening the breach benre now chnmctcrlzed by 1.\Il lncrenslng two- tween us and the U.S .S .R. We have beeti
"l<ay flow of trudc, people and other pence!ul supporting Western Europe now for over
f?Xchange: nnd
20 years, and I sincerely believe that it
"Whereas the present pollcy of ml\lnta.lntng Is long p ast time t.o move out of t.here.
lnrgo contln t:cntll of United States forces
and tht>lr d t'pendcnt.s on the European Con- If protec tion is needed, which I doubt,
tlucnt nlso contributes further to the fiscal the countries of that area are well able
and monetary problems of the United States: to care for t.hemselves.
Now. therefore, be It
Keeping our troops there tends to
"Resolrcd, That-maintain the fear and suspicion that the
"(1) It Is the serL~e o! the Senate, thst with U.S.S.R. has of us and I have no doubt
chonges and Improvements 1n the techniques that the Russians will follow suit and reor modem wnrfare nnd because of the vnst move their forces from the countries of
1ncresse In capnclty of the United States to
WAge war and to move mlllt.a.ry forces a.nd Eastern Europe. As I have often said in
equipment by air, a substantial reduction of the past, when former President De
Gaulle of France ordered us out of his
Untt<>d States force~J permanently stationed
In Europe ca.n be mnde without adversely coun try we should have then and there
affecting eltller our resolve or n.blllty to meet left Europe.
our commitment under the North Atlantic
In my most recent visit to the U.S.S.R.,
Tr ~aty;
In 1968, I have reported to this body
"(2) S . Res. 09, adopted 1n the Sennte
Apt II 4, 195 I, L• amended bO contain tho that I can see no world peace unl e~s and
provlnlnllfl o f t.hl~ rr·:olutlon and, where tho until we ran dlfl]wl t.he ft'ftr nnd snsplrlon t.hn.t now cxlsl.s hdwc<"n ttfl ntH!
t P•;O)\Ji.(ft11fl J)tf\y ('OIIf!lf•t., tliO prl'n(•nt fl'nOIU•
lion lfl ('OIIIrolllllg M to thO AOIIfiO O( tho tllo U F.I.S.n.. n.ncl WI' should nwkr rvt'ry
effort IA:l ncconlttwtlntc our~PlV('fl wll,h Lho
"7't•rut.• of off.•l't artrl'eWr71 t ,, bctwrra the Russl ltll people. Tl1nt cnn be done withU111trd States and WeAtern Germany, /16• out in a.ny manner embracing each
cal 1962-1969
others philosophy of government.
" [In millions of dollars 1
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